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As a law student, Thomas Jefferson followed the customary practice
of keeping a commonplace book in which he recorded his notes of law
reports and other legal authorities which he perused in the course of his
reading and study.' Two such volumes have been preserved. Because of the
nature of their contents, one is commonly called his Legal Commonplace
Book and the other his Equity Commonplace Book.
The distinction between those branches of Anglo-American law known
as "common law' 2 and "equity" was important until recent years because
each was a separate system of rules applied by separate courts. Modem law
seeks to amalgamate in a single body of law administered in a single tribunal
the doctrines developed by both types of courts in the course of their
histories. 3 Nevertheless, as a renowned historian of English Law has ex-
plained, the distinction is basically rooted in history:
Equity now is that body of rules administered by our English courts
of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature
* Dedicated to the memory of John W. Davis, superb lawyer and pioneer in scholarly
scrutiny of Thomas Jefferson's career in the legal profession.
** A.B. 1926, Princeton; LL.B. 1929, LL.M. 1930, Harvard; Dr. Jur. 1932, University
of Leyden, The Netherlands; LL.D. 1981, Findlay College. Honorary Vice-President, American
Society of International Law; Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
1. E. DuMBAuLD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND n LAW 8, 15 (1978). Chief Justice Matthew
Hale regarded the practice as "the best expedient that I know for the orderly and profitable
study of the law." Id. at 15. Jefferson advised law students:
In reading the Reporters, enter in a Common-place book every case of value,
condensed into the narrowest compass possible which will admit of presenting
distinctly the principles of the case. This operation is doubly useful, inasmuch as it
obliges the student to seek out the pith of the case, and habituates him to a
condensation of thought, and to an acquisition of the most valuable of all talents,
that of never using two words where one will do. It fixes the case too more indelibly
in the mind.
Id. at 8.
2. Probably the term "common law" originally meant the nationally applicable law
(common to the whole kingdom) fashioned by the king's central courts at Westminster as
distinguished from local customary rules (such as the custom of Kent). See id. at 12 & nn.60-
63, 80 n.55. Hence the term often is used to distinguish judge-made law from statutory
enactments by legislative bodies. The term also is used to signify the entire Anglo-American
legal system, in contrast to the civil or Roman law system in force on the Continent. Here,
however, we are concerned with use of the term "common law" as distinguished from
"equity." Perennial popular complaints against common law and its practitioners criticized
the law's voluminous complexity, uncertainty and expense. See id. at 146, 148, 154. Many
sympathized with William Penn's quip: "Certainly, if the common law be so hard to be
understood, it is far from being very common." Id. at 154 n.123.
3. Id. at 15 n.84, 149 n.63.
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Acts, would be administered by those courts which would be known
as Courts of Equity.... Equity is a certain portion of our existing
substantive law, yet in order that we may describe this portion and
mark it off from the other portions we have to make reference to
courts that are no longer in existence. Still I fear that nothing better
than this is possible.
4
From the substantive standpoint, equity seeks to mitigate the rigor of
strict application of technical common law rules by an infusion of ethical
and moral standards of equity and fairness. In early times the chancellor
was normally a high ecclesiastical dignitary and as "keeper of the king's
conscience" undertook to temper the impact of common law formalism by
decrees more adequate to the exigencies of justice.5 Likewise in Roman law
the praetor acted juris civilis adjuvandi aut supplendi aut corrigendi causa
(to support, supplement, or correct the civil law) to mitigate the rigor of
the strict civil law.
6
Against equity's advantages of flexibility and fairness must be weighed
the disadvantages of uncertainty and possible arbitrariness. Those who value
certainty above justice7 might consider equity a "roguish thing," as capri-
cious a measure as the length of the chancellor's foot, as the learned John
Selden wittily observed.' Jefferson himself thought that Lord Mansfield's
innovations in equity made the law more uncertain "under pretence of
rendering it more reasonable." 9
Jefferson's Legal Commonplace Book, dealing with judicial decisions
and authorities relating to common law, is well known to historians by
virtue of Gilbert Chinard's edition published in 1926.10 Chinard's chief
concern was with the development of Jefferson's ideas on government.
Hence he prints in full only those portions which are of political interest.
Of those dealing with "strictly legal matters" ordinarily only the subject or
title is listed, though occasionally brief extracts are given." Chinard deter-
mines, by analysis of the contents, that of the 905 numbered items in the
Legal Commonplace Book, Jefferson wrote items 1-550 while he was a law
4. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (1913).
5. A typical instance of intervention by equity occurs where the holder of a bond which
has been paid in full but not returned to the obligor is compelled to surrender it, and thus
prevent its fraudulent use to bring suit at law for a second payment of the same debt. See
Dumbauld, Judicial Interference With Litigation in Other Courts, 74 DICK. L. REV. 369, 378-
83 (1970). See also infra note 6.
6. 1 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 406-21 (1959).
7. See E. DumBAULD, supra note 1, at 31 & n.145.
8. Id. at 16 & n.102.
9. Id. at 9 n.28. This statement appears in a letter to a foreign friend of Italian
extraction, dated November 28, 1785, in which Jefferson explained in detail the distinction in
American jurisprudence between common law and equity. See id.
10. See G. CHINARD, THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REPERTORY OF
His IDEAS ON GOVERNMENT (1926). The manuscript volume of Jefferson's Legal Commonplace
Book is in the Library of Congress.
11. Id. at 14, 67.
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student or a young lawyer; items 550-881 (on feudalism, federalism, Mon-
tesquieu, Beccaria, Voltaire, and the like) between 1774 and 1776, when he
was interested in matters "worthy of attention in constituting an American
congress"; items 882-900 after 1781; and items 901-904 after 1801.32 Item
905 refers to a debate in the House of Commons on March 23, 1824.'3
Chinard does not attempt to date items by the ink or handwriting.' 4
However, Marie Kimball concludes from analysis of paper and handwriting
that the first 174 items were written in 1766, and items 175-695 after August,
1767.'- She likewise states that Jefferson began the Equity Commonplace
Book in 1765, and that entries in the Equity Commonplace Book and in
the Legal Commonplace Book were made concurrently. 6 Abstracts from
the reports of Salkeld 7 and Lord Raymond 8 constitute the most substantial
portion of the Legal Commonplace Book.' 9 Other legal matters, and the
political material which chiefly interests Chinard, complete the volume.
The Equity Commonplace Book contains 2018 items, all dealing with
legal rather than political topics. Salkeld furnishes the source for the first
twenty-one items. Items 22 through 618 consist of abstracts from Vernon. 20
12. Id. at 13-14, 26-27.
13. Id. at 12-13.
14. Id. at 12.
15. M. KnmAL, JFFTEsoN: THE RoAD To GLORy 1743 TO 1776 87-88 (1943). See also
F. KniBALL, THom.S JEF ERSoN ARcHITEcT 106-16 (1916) (discussing watermarks of paper used
by Jefferson).
16. M. KamALL, supra note 15, at 89. The Equity Commonplace Book has never been
published. The manuscript volume is in the Huntington Library, Brock Collection, BR 13.
Later research on dating the Equity Commonplace Book (from 1765 or 1766 through 1766 or
1768), during the period of Jefferson's study of law, is documented in Wilson, Thomas
Jefferson's Early Notebooks, 42 WM. & MARY Q. 433, 444, 449-51 (Third Series, No. 4, Oct.
1985). As to its contents, Wilson regards the Equity Commonplace Book as "a source of the
first importance" since its focus is upon a theme congenial to Jefferson's philosophy, "the
application of natural law to practical affairs." Id. at 449.
17. Jefferson used the first two volumes of the reports of William Salkeld (1671-1715),
which were first published in 1717 under the supervision of Lord Hardwicke. Volume III
appeared in 1743 (the year of Jefferson's birth). Salkeld's reports cover the period 1689-1712,
with a few earlier and later cases. See E. DumBAuLD, supra note 1, at 15 n.87.
18. Robert Raymond (1672-1733) became Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in
1724. His reports, published in 1743, cover the period 1694-1732. See id. at 15 n.88.
19. Of the 905 items, 407 are abstracts from Salkeld br Lord Raymond. There are Ill
cases abstracted from other law reports (items 588-693, 744, 899-903). The remainder of the
compilation is composed of extracts from numerous authors, mainly on feudalism, federalism,
and other political topics. See id. at 15 n.89. For details, see 0. CHmNAR, supra note 10, at
14-52.
20. The two posthumous volumes of Thomas Vernon (1654-1721), Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the High Court of Chancery, were published in 1726-28, and cover the period
1681-1720. His reports are brief and often inaccurate. A better edition by Raithby appeared
in 1806-1807. See E. DuimBuL, supra note 1, at 16 & nn.110-11. I used the first American
edition of Vernon from the third London edition (by Raithby) published in Brookfield,
Massachusetts, in 1829. In researching all the equity reports cited herein, I have used editions
available at the Allegheny Bar Association Library at Pittsburgh (for assembling which I am
grateful to Joel Fishman, its librarian) rather than searching for the particular editions probably
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Items 619 through 1063 are derived from Peere Williams.2' Items 1064-1076
are derived from A General Abridgment of Cases in Equity (cited by
Jefferson as "Abr. ca. eq."). This collection, often called Equity Cases
Abridged was published in 1732, with a second part published in 1756.2
Henry Home, Lord Kames (which Jefferson always spelled "Kaims")
was a Scottish judge and philosopher greatly esteemed by Jefferson, and
his Principles of Equity published in 1760 was the source of items 1077-
1131 in Jefferson's Equity Commonplace Book.? In the familiar plan of
law study which Jefferson prescribed for young friends whose legal studies
he supervised, this volume by Lord Kames was listed: "In the department
of the Chancery ... [Kames] has given us the first digest of the principles
of that branch of our jurisprudence, more valuable for the arrangement of
matter, than for it's exact conformity with the English decisions."
Items 1132-1402 are derived from Cases Argued and Decreed in the
High Court of Chancery (cited "Ca. Ch." by Jefferson). 2 Items 1403-1586
are derived from Freeman ("Fr. Ch. R."). 26 Items 1587-1779 are from
Reports ... in ... Chancery ("Ch. Rep."). 27 Items 1780-1811, 1813, and
used by Jefferson. I have used Jefferson's characteristic abbreviations in citing them. Vernon
is referred to herein as "Vern."
21. William Peere Williams (1664-1736) has been described as "the first full and clear
reporter of Chancery cases." His Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court
of Chancery (cited herein as "P.W.") were published by his son (two volumes in 1740, and
a third in 1749). They cover the period 1695-1736, and are digested in both of Jefferson's
commonplace books. See E. DuhMAuLD, supra note 1, at 16 & nn.98-100. I used the third
London edition (1768) of volumes I and II, and the first edition (1749) of volume III.
22. See E. DumBAULD, supra note 1, at 15-16 & n.97. This collection contains cases from
the "earliest time" to 1756, and Jefferson included the collection in his list of required reading
for law students. See id. at 8.
23. See id. at 15 & nn.94-96. Note that there are two items numbered 1082 and 1210.
Irregularities of numbering also occur in other portions of the commonplace book. Items 266-
274 and i717 are omitted, and there are two sets of items numbered 989-998. Continuations
of many items are found out of sequence, probably representing Jefferson's subsequent
reflections regarding those cases, perhaps after reading them in a different reporter. Alternative
citations for the same case ("S.C.") often have been added and references to other cases
standing for the same principles ("S.P.") also are frequently inserted.
24. See id. at 8.
25. See id. at 16 & nn.112-13. Three volumes of Cases Argued and Decreed in the High
Court of Chancery (of which Jefferson used only the first two) were published in 1697-1702,
covering the period 1660-1688. I used the London edition of 1735 (3rd edition for volume I,
2nd edition for "The Second Part," 30 Charles 11-4 James II).
26. See E. DUrmAULD, supra note 1, at 16 & n.114. One volume of Cases Argued and
Decreed in the High Court of Chancery, From 1676 to 1706, by Richard Freeman, was
published in 1742 and was edited by Thomas Dixon. Freeman had been Lord Chancellor of
Ireland. See id. This volume is cited as "Freeman" from the 1742 London edition.
27. Three volumes of Reports of Cases Taken and Adjudged in the Court of Chancery
were published in 1693, 1697, and 1716, respectively, covering the period 1625-1710. Jefferson
used only the first two volumes. See E. DUmAuLD, supra note 1, at 16 & n.112. On the title
page of the London 1693 edition of volume I, which I used, are the signatures of "Alexr
Addison, 1793" and "James Ross, 1887." On Alexander Addison, see 3 A. BvrminaE, THE
LuE oF JomH MxsAnL 46-47, 163-64 (1919); on Addison's impeachment, see THE TaxL. OF
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1817-1999 are from Precedents in Chancery ("Pr. Ch."), published in 1733. 28
Item 1812 is from Vernon, and items 1814-16 from Peere Williams. Items
2000-2017 are from Atkyns ("Atk.").2 Item 2018, the last item in the
Equity Commonplace Book, deals with interpretation of acts of Parliament.
In each item of his Equity Commonplace Book, Jefferson usually first
states briefly the facts of the case and the issues argued (abbreviating
plaintiff as pl. and defendant as def.). Then follows the decision by the
court ("cur."), the Lord Chancellor ("L.C."), the Lord Keeper ("L.K."),
the Master of the Rolls ("M.R."), or occasionally, the House of Lords
("D.P.", or Domus Procerum). Finally Jefferson cites the source where the
report of the case is published.
In that connection the reader must remember, in order to avoid con-
fusion, that in the case of some reporters (e.g., Vernon and Peere Williams)
Jefferson, when writing, for example, "2 Ver[non]. 326" in item 386 is
referring to the case number, not the page number, in Vernon's second
volume, whereas his citation of the same case in Freeman refers to the page
number, 228 (the case number in Freeman is 299). His citations to reports
which do not contain case numbers, such as Cases ... in ... Chancery
("Ca. Ch.") and Reports... in... Chancery ("Ch. Rep."), are of course
to page numbers, but he also cites Atkyns ("Atk.") and Precedents in
Chancery ("Pr.Ch."), as well as Freeman, by page numbers. The citations
given in footnotes of this article are uniformly to page numbers.
Analyzing the Equity Commonplace Book in extensive detail would be
tedious and unprofitable. Like any law student's notebook, the Equity
Commonplace Book is a collection of brief abstracts of cases examined by
the student in the course of his study. Because the equity reports utilized
by Jefferson are available to readers today, anyone could make a similar
digest of them himself, in all probability just as satisfactory a compilation
as the one Jefferson prepared. Discussing certain significant and distinctive
aspects of the materials contained in the volume, particularly as they
illustrate Jefferson's own legal thinking and his comments on the topics
treated, will be more useful.
ALEXANDER ADDISON . .. TAKEN im SHORT HAND BY THoMAs LLOYD (2d ed. 1803). Addison's
Reports of Cases (Washington, 1800) is bound with his Charges to Grand Juries in Western
Pennsylvania, the partisan animus of which led to his impeachment.
28. See E. DumiiAuW, supra note 1, at 16 & nn.115-16. This volume covers the period
1689-1722. I used the 1786 London edition by Thomas Finch, of which Jefferson owned a
copy, and which now is in the Library of Congress.
29. The first volume of John Tracy Atkyns' Reports of Cases Argued and Determined
in the High Court of Chancery, in the Time of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, which Jefferson
used, was published in 1765. Two subsequent volumes were issued in 1767 and 1768. Atkyns'
reports, considered somewhat unreliable, cover the period 1736-1755. A second edition was
published in 1781. Atkyns, of Lincoln's Inn, was an English judge who died in '1773. See E.
DumBALrD, supra note 1, at 16 & nn.117-19. I used the Dublin edition of 1765.
30. See E. DumrAuLD, supra note 1, at 16-17 & n.120. Sir Edward Coke, Sir John
Fortescue, Sir Thomas Siderfin, and George Petyt's Lex Parliamentaria are cited.
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Before reviewing any specific topics found in the commonplace book,
a summary of some of the technical features of equity practice which will
be encountered repeatedly in the cases digested by Jefferson may be helpful.
Blackstone gives a good explanation of the general procedures followed in
the courts of equity.3' The first peculiarity of equity which Blackstone
enumerates is the mode of proof, which requires the oath of the parties in
order to discover facts and circumstances known only to them.32 Such
compulsory discovery upon oath enables the court of equity to undo the
effects of fraud and enforce matters binding in conscience, though con-
cealed. This authority includes prohibiting the parties from taking advantage
of judgments obtained at law by suppressing the truth.
A second distinctive feature is the mode of trial.33 The first pleading
friled in an equity suit is called a bill. The next step is issuance of a subpoena
calling upon the defendant to answer the bill under oath. Before answering,
the defendant may demur or plead. A demurrer puts before the court the
question whether the plaintiff, upon his own showing, lacks any right or
ground for equitable relief. A demurrer also will be sustained if the bill
seeks discovery of any circumstance which may cause a forfeiture of any
kind or result in self-incrimination. A plea may question the court's juris-
diction or the plaintiff's capacity to sue or set forth matters barring relief,
such as a release or a former decree. After answering, the plaintiff may file
a reply, and the defendant may file a rejoinder. Proofs are then taken by
the court.
Instead of trial by jury and examination of witnesses viva voce (orally),
equity resorts to written interrogatories in response to which the parties'
depositions are taken in writing wherever they happen to live. If the parties
live in London, there is an examiner's office; if they live in the country,
four commissioners are appointed. If a party resides abroad, or is about to
depart, or if a party is aged or infirm, a commission to examine the party
for the perpetuation of the party's testimony may be granted. Depositions
are kept secret until all witnesses have been examined, when they are made
public. After publication all parties may inspect the depositions and make
copies. The case is then heard before the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper
or the Master of the Rolls. The decision is called a decree. Often the first
decree is interlocutory rather than final. If a question of fact is strongly
controverted, the court will refer it to the Court of the King's Bench upon
a feigned issue. A pure question of law may also be referred to the judges
of the Court of the King's Bench or Court of Common Pleas upon a case
stated. Matters of accounting always are referred to a master in chancery
31. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON anE LAWS OF ENOLAND 436-55 (Oxford
1768). This account may be supplemented by the description of the development and scope of
equity in the seventeenth century given by Holdsworth. 6 W. HoLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 640-71 (1927). The cases in the Equity Commonplace Book are typical of the
content of equity jurisprudence as set forth by Holdsworth.
32. 3 W. BLAcKsToNE, supra note 31, at 436-38.
33. Id. at 438.
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to examine and report to the court. When a final decree is signed and
enrolled, the decree can not be reheard or rectified except by a bill of
review, or upon appeal to the House of Lords.
The third distinctive feature is the mode of relief.34 Instead of an award
of pecuniary damages for non-performance of a contract, the usual mode
of relief in equity is to order specific performance of the contract (if the
contract is one relating to land or a unique chattel where damages would
not be an adequate remedy). Equity likewise, in appropriate cases, prevents
or forestalls the occurrence of injury by granting injunctive relief. An
injunction may either require or prohibit the performance of an act.
Mortgages and trusts comprise the remaining topics of distinctive equity
jurisdiction mentioned by Blackstone.35
In view of Jefferson's proclamation in the Declaration of Independence
of "unalienable Rights" derived from "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God, ' 36 it will be of interest to discuss cases where he noted that the courts
of equity based their decisions upon tenets of natural law and justice. Such
instances also will illustrate the infusion of moral principles which Dean
Pound has described as characteristic of equity.37 Singling out for exami-
nation passages where Jefferson's own comments or queries are set forth,
and where he is not simply chronicling the rulings of the court as recorded
by the reporter, also will be useful. A third category of cases worthy of
notice includes those dealing with peculiar features of equitable relief as
administered by English chancery judges.
I. NAT RAL JusTIcE
The cases abstracted in the Equity Commonplace Book frequently refer
to natural justice.38 Where lands had been sold to a bankrupt and part of
the purchase money had not been paid, it was held that the vendor had
34. Id. at 438-39.
35. Id. at 439-40.
36. E. DumBAum, Tan DEcLA nON OF INDEPENDENCE 35-45, 58-59, 63, 69 (1950). For
specific categories of natural rights recognized by Jefferson, see E. DUMBAuLD, THE POLITCrAL
Warrwurs op THommS J Fm xso xxvii-xxix (1955).
37. See R. PoUND, supra note 6, at 407.
38. In this article, cases ordinarily will be treated in the sequence in which they appear
in the Equity Commonplace Book, and will be cited by item number, followed by a citation
in the customary form, giving the name of the case, the name of the reporter preceded by
volume number and followed by page number, and the date of decision. I have accepted dates
given by Jefferson. Dates calculated from the table in 8 A. BRowNING, ENGLISH HisTOICAL
Docurmrs 949 (1966), when only the term of court and the regnal year are known, may be
inaccurate. As historians are aware, "Old Style" years (up to 1700) began March 25, rather
than January 1. Most of the calculations herein involved the reign of Charles II, which began
January 30, 1649. Language attributed to judges comes from Jefferson's paraphrase, except
when quotations from the reports are given for comparison. Contrary to Jefferson's practice,
capital letters are used at the beginning of sentences. But his peculiarities of spelling (such as
"paiment" for "payment" and "it's" for "its") are preserved. Some abbreviations are
expanded in brackets.
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priority over the general creditors for the unpaid balance. The Lord Keeper
is reported as saying: "There is a natural equity that the lands shall be
charged with the purchase money not paid, tho' there was no special
agreement."
39
Where a son had quarreled with his mother, and settled his mansion
on his brother, taking from him a bond not to permit the mother to come
into the house, the court ordered the bond to be delivered up and cancelled,
for "it is ag[ains]t the law of nature to prohibit a son from cherishing his
mother." 4 Likewise, when an infant recovered by a decree, the court
"allot[ed] him a maintenance out of it, by natural equity. '41 And where a
mortgage was devised to a wife for her separate use and her husband, in
writing, granted her the benefit of it, and the mortgagor then devised the
land to the husband to pay debts, it was held that the wife "shall have the
interest as well as principal, because of the husband's note, which tho'
voluntary is grounded on natural justice." 42
In another case, articles of agreement provided that £200 belonging to
a wife, forming part of a settlement upon the spouses for life and then in
tail to the heirs of their bodies, was to go to the wife's brother and sister
if no settlement were made during the spouses' joint lives. No settlement
was made, and the wife died during her husband's lifetime, leaving issue.
The court held that the words "without issue" should be supplied, for "the
intent of the articles was to provide for the issue in obedience to the law
of nature." Although the letter of the articles provided that the money was
to go to the brother and sister "if the wife died, leaving the husband, yet
they must have meant, if she died 'without issue."
'' 43
Similarly, in the case of defective execution of a power to create a
jointure by deed under hand and seal, the holder of the power having
undertaken to execute it by will under his hand and seal, the Master of the
Rolls explained that equity would come to the aid of such defective execution
of a power. Equity would not interfere, however, in case of non-execution
of a power, "because it was at the election of the party to execute or not,
and perhaps he chose not to do it." But defective execution will be aided
"where it is for paim[en]t of debts, or provision for a wife or child
unprovided for, these being acts of duty."" In a similar case the Lord
39. Item 123, Chapman v. Tanner, I Vern. 267 (1684).
40. Item 177, Traiton v. Traiton, 1 Vern. 413, 414 (1686).
41. Item 323, Englefield v. Englefield, 2 Vern. 236 (1691). See also item 1160, Rennessey
v. Parrot, 1 Ca. Ch. 60 (1665).
42. Item 559, Harvey v. Harvey, 2 Vern. 659, 660 (1710), 1 P.W. 125, 126.
43. Item 642, Kentish v. Newman, 1 P.W. 234 (1713).
44. Item 897, Toilet v. Toilet, 2 P.W. 489 (1728). To the same effect see item 1269,
Smith v. Ashton, I Ca. Ch. 264 (1675); item 1464, [Anon.], Freeman 63 (1680); item 1766,
Sale v. Freeland, 2 Ch. Rep. 242 (1680). An obligation ex maleficio (from malice or wrongdoing)
was viewed as less sacred than a contractual debt. "The pl. sued the def. for intimacy with
his wife. The def. conveys his estate to trustees for the paiment of his debts. After which pl.
recovered of him 5000. lib. The bill is to set aside the conveiance as fraudulent, and designed
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Chancellor said that circumstances may be supplied generally in favor of a
bona fide purchaser, and also where a settlement is "made on some moral
consid[eratio]n, as the paim[en]t of debts, or providing for children, which
is in nature of a debt, every man being bound by the law of nature to
provide for his children.
'4
In kindred vein is the pronouncement that to her dower a widow has
not only a legal right but "a moral right: because the husband is bound
not only by the law of God to provide for her during her life," especially
"where the civil laws vest all her property in him on marriage and render
her incapable of acquiring property of her own during the coverture."
Likewise she has "an equitable right: arising from a contract made on a
valuable consideration; a contract in it's nature civil, in it's celebration
sacred; and such a one as is a foundation for relief in a court of equity.""6
Similarly, the Lord Chancellor declared that "a man cannot be deprived of
the natural right of guardianship of his own children because another thinks
proper to give them legacies however great." The children were with the
executor of their uncle who had left them substantial gifts.
7
Where an act of Parliament prohibited dealings in shares of a "bubble"
company, the Master of the Rolls held that a buyer was released from his
bargain to purchase shares. "It is against natural justice that any one should
to defeat him." But the court held that
it is not fraudulent tho' intended to prefer the creditors before the pl. But it was
conscientious in him so to do, the debt to the pl. being only founded in maleficio.
Nor was there any debt to him at the making of the deed. However the pl. may
contest the debts and come in on the surplus after paim[en]t of those which shall
be proved just.
Item 1562, Leukener v. Freeman, Freeman 236 (1699); Lawkner v. Freeman, Pr. Ch. 105.
45. Item 1495, Duchess of Albemarle v. Earl of Bath, Freeman 121, 195-96 (1692). To
the same effect see item 1655, Thin v. Thin, 1 Ch. Rep. 162 (1650); item 1956, Piggot v.
Penrice, Pr. Ch. 471 (1717). However, the Lord Chancellor refused to supply the lack of
surrender to the use of a conveyance of copyhold by deed to a natural child, "Because tho'
the father was obliged by the law of nature to provide for her, yet in this, and every other
court she is considered as nullius filia (daughter of no one)." Item 1958, Fursaker v. Robinson,
Pr. Ch. 475 (1717). However, provision for a seduced "modest woman" and her child was
upheld in another case. The Lord Chancellor said: "If a man misleads an innocent woman,
it is both reason and justice he should make reparation." Item 88, Marchioness of Annandale
v. Harris, 2 P.W. 432 (1727). A bond to leave £1000 to a second wife who had no knowledge
of the prior marriage was postponed until all simple contract creditors were satisfied. Said the
Master of the Rolls:
Had the bond been given on the first discovery and by way of recompence for the
injury, and they had thereon parted, it had been a meritorious consid[eratio]n. But
as it was over 5 years after the discovery, it was most probably to induce her to
continue to live in adultery with him which is a wicked consideration. Had this been
given to a lawful wife after marriage, it would have been a voluntary bond, and
void ag[ains]t creditors: and much rather shall it here, when given in an illicit
consid[eratio]n. Let it be postponed to all the simple contract debts.
Item 1031, Lady Cox's Case, 3 P.W. 339 (1734).
46. Item 940, Banks v. Sutton, 2 P.W. 700 (1732).
47. Item 981, Ex parte Hopkins, 3 P.W. 152 (1732).
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pay for a bargain which he cannot have: there should be a quid pro quo;
the money cannot be said to be due in conscience if the purchaser cannot
come at what it was to be paid for."
Upon a bill by a widow against her husband's heir (but where his
executors were not parties) for rebuilding her jointure house which he had
wrongfully pulled down, the Lord Chancellor refused relief in the absence
of the executors, because "The personal estate is the natural fund for the
paiment of debts; and I will not decree the heir to perform the covenant
first and then put him to his bill ag[ains]t the ex[ecuto]r to be reimbursed,
when had both been before the court, one decree would have been sufficient,
ag[ains]t the ex[ecuto]r as far as the personal estate would go, and then
ag[ainsit the real assets in the hands of the heir." 49 Natural justice also is
the basis of the right to offset mutual debts, and to redeem after failure to
make punctual payment of a debt secured by mortgage. According to
natural justice, "The m[ortga]gee has a right to the money, and his right
to the land is only as a security." 0
The foregoing references to natural law and natural justice, in connec-
tion with the rulings routinely made by equity courts in the normal course
of business (quite apart from the discussions of those topics contained in
the long extracts from Lord Kames-1 ), support the conventional wisdom
that Jefferson and many outstanding eighteenth century lawyers applied
those principles in actual practice, and that the infusion of morals which
Dean Pound speaks of as characteristic of equity did indeed take place and
shape the course of Anglo-American jurisprudence.-
2
II. JEFFRSON'S COMMENTS
Since the Equity Commonplace Book, unlike the Legal Commonplace
Book,53 contains no material relating to political topics and does not include
any specimens of Jefferson's own original legal writing,5 it is difficult to
48. Item 816, Stent v. Bailis, 2 P.W. 217, 219, 222 (1724). On a rehearing before Lord
Chancellor King, the chancellor advised an "accommodation."
49. Item 1027, Knight v. Knight, 3 P.W. 331, 333-34 (1734). However, a bill to foreclose
a mortgage is against an equity in the heir alone. A marginal note by the reporter calls
attention to the "diversity where the ex[ecuto]r as well as heir is liable to the demand, on
account of his having the natural fund for debts, and where the bill is only to bar an equity
of redemption which is in the heir alone." When lands are devised in trust to pay debts, "the
land being debtor," all debts, specialties, simple contracts, and legacies share equally. It is
otherwise with respect to judgments, which affect land by their own strength and nature. Item
1525, Croft v. Long, Freeman 175 (1663). See also item 1179, Smith v. Smout, 1 Ca. Ch. 88
(1668).
50. Item 665, Lord Lanesborough v. Jones, 1 P.W. 325, 326 (1716); item 1274, Thorn-
borough v. Baker, 1 Ca. Ch. 283, 285 (1676).
51. Items 1077, 1078, and 1081.
52. See, e.g., H.T. COLBoURN, THE LAmp OF EXPERIENCE 77, 190 (1965):
53. See supra text accompanying note 11.
54. The Legal Commonplace Book includes, for example, Jefferson's "disquisition" on
Christianity as part of the common law, which comprises items 873 and 887. See E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 1, at 17, 76-79.
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identify passages in the Equity Commonplace Book which typify Jefferson's
own legal reasoning or rumination as distinguished from his conspectus of
the rules laid down by the court decisions contained in the reports which
he utilized as a law student. However, throughout the Equity Commonplace
Book, especially in its early pages, there are numerous interlineations and
marginal notes where Jefferson added additional material derived from
authorities encountered in the course of his later research. Most often he
merely added an additional citation where the same case ("S.C.") is found
in another report, or where the same principle ("S.P.") is followed in
another case.
Sometimes Jefferson remarked that the case is "more fully reported"
in the newly added citation. Thus, to an item originally reading: "The
def. had confessed at a former trial that a marriage settlement had come
to his hands, but now denied it, tho' it was proved. Decreed the pl. should
enjoy the estate on a presumption that the def. suppressed the settlement.
Eyton v. Eyton 2 Ver. 346" the following interlineation was added:
S.C. Pr. Ch. 116. (1700) more fully reported, where no such
presumption is mentioned, but the M.R. [Master of the Rolls] and
L.C. [Lord Chancellor] seem to have considered the former answer
and a counterpart of the settlement which the pl. had preserved as
sufficient evidence. Nor could they 'have gone on the presumption
of fraud in one def. when the decree equally affected other defs
who were clear of the imputation of fraud.
This comment clearly embodies the results of Jefferson's comparison
of the two reports of the case. The point which he makes in the last
sentence quoted (that other defendants affected by the decree were not
parties to any possible suppression of the settlement) seems to be his own
conclusion from the facts set forth in the more detailed account of the case
given in "Pr. Ch." [Precedents in Chancery]. That proposition is nowhere
explicitly stated in the report, although the report discusses data from which
Jefferson's conclusion can be derived.
In the case described above, plaintiff David's claim was based upon a
settlement supposedly made by his grandfather Thomas, who left three sons,
the eldest (Benjamin) being a lunatic, and the second (Randall) having died
without issue. Plaintiff David and defendant John were the offspring of
Thomas's third son. At an earlier stage in the litigation David sued his
brother John, as well as John's wife Jane, and Benjamin her father, seeking
discovery. John admitted having possession of the settlement, and set forth
its terms, but was unwilling to part with it because it belonged to Benjamin.
Several years later, after Benjamin had died without male issue (leaving
only his daughters Jane and Anne), David amended his bill, adding Anne
as a defendant. John answered, saying that he had delivered the settlement
to Benjamin and kept no copy, and did not know whether the terms were
55. Item 395, Eyton v. Eyton, 2 Vern. 346 (1700).
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correctly stated in his previous answer, but that he knew of no other
settlement. Jane and Anne answered separately, insisting on their title as
heirs to Benjamin and Thomas. Plaintiff had procured and offered in
evidence a counterpart of the deed of settlement. Some proof existed that
Randall had sold some land, but there was no other proof of the settlement.
Disregarding the settlement, Thomas's lands would descend by primo-
geniture to Benjamin and then to his two daughters as coparceners, and
John would hold jure uxoris (by the right of his wife) his wife's share. But
under the settlement, he being apparently the younger son, the entire estate
would go to David as tenant in tail male upon the death of both his uncles
without male issue. There would thus be an economic motive for John to
suppress the settlement, but if he had succumbed to temptation he would
hardly have disclosed the terms of the settlement as he did in the previous
proceedings.
At the hearing, the ampler report in Precedents in Chancery states, "It
was insisted that the husband's answer, whereby he had confessed the
settlement, was not evidence against his wife (being in a matter of inheri-
tance) and that without other evidence of the settlement" they could not
make use of the document "pretended to be a counterpart." But the Lord
Keeper thought that as the record stood "the counterpart would of itself
be evidence enough at law of the settlement. Sed quaere de hoc (but query
as to this)."
'56
Possibly the court was convinced that John's admission sufficiently
proved the existence of a settlement, and that the proffered counterpart
probably could be relied on for precise delineation of the settlement's terms
since it followed the pattern of standard provisions for entailing land
successively to several sons in tail male. In any event, the account in
Precedents in Chancery leaves one with the impression that the defendant
John was probably a bumbling squire rather than a scheming plotter
planning the perpetration of a fraud. And (as Jefferson deduced from the
facts) even if he had been guilty of suppressing the settlement, the other
parties affected by the decree were not co-conspirators with him, and the
court's decision could not have rested primarily on a presumption of fraud.
A case found three items further on in the commonplace book warrants
a similar inference of original reflection on Jefferson's part.5 7 The original
entry in that item recorded a ruling which denied the prayer of a plaintiff
who, in lieu of a jointure at marriage, had received a rent-charge with
power of distress. Because the arrears were so great that distress was
insufficient, plaintiff desired to hold the land until satisfaction could be
forthcoming. The reason given for the decision was that "the law gives no
remedy but what the party has provided himself."
Jefferson's interlineation adds "nor does there appear any fraud in the
def. to prevent the pl. of his legal remedy, which might entitle this court
56. Eyton v. Eyton, Pr. Ch. 116, 118-19 (1700).
57. Item 398, Champernoon v. Grubbs, 2 Vern. 382 (1700), Pr. Ch. 126.
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to give him any other." This passage is an extract from the court's opinion
as reported in the supplemental citation. But Jefferson then cites another
case where "on a bill by a devisee of a rentcharge with power of distress,
setting forth that the annual profits of the lands were not more than half
sufficient, the Ch[ancello]r relieved, going principally on the intention of
the test[ato]r." A bracketed passage follows, stating that "perhaps tho['] it
might weigh that the pl. in this case being a devisee had been guilty of no
laches." 5 In other words, the plaintiff in the second case, being a mere
transferee of the right held by the previous owner of the rent-charge, could
not be blamed, like the plaintiff in the first case who was himself an
original party to the marriage settlement agreement, for having failed to
negotiate a more advantageous bargain or a more adequate remedy. This
comment may be ascribed to Jefferson's comparison of the cases. 9
An even stronger inference of originality is justified when a bracketed
comment speaks in the first person: "I should infer from this case that one
who has general letters of attorney may answer without oath." In the case
'to which Jefferson referred,
J.S. residing at Tunis sues J.N. at law in England. J.N. brings a
bill in chancery agAinst him and gets an order that service on J.S.'s
attorney at law should be good, but a commssion shall go to Tunis
to take his answer, for the answer of this attorney without oath
shall not be sufficient.
Jefferson's comment appears to be a conclusion which he derived from
the court's remark: "If there had been a general Letter of Attorney to one
to appear in and defend Suits, the Court would have ordered such Attorney
to appear for the Principal, and that Service on him should have been good
Service." But it may be an incorrect conclusion, for the court also said:
"Plaintiff is entitled to a Discovery and Answer without Oath is nothing."
In the case at bar the plaintiff had obtained an order that service of
summons on the plaintiffs Attorney would be good service. The court's
comment about a general letter of attorney may mean that under such a
58. Jefferson spells "laches" as "lachesse." Item 398, Foster v. Foster, 2 Vern. 386
(1700).
59. Other bracketed passages or interlineations, however, specifically refer to the com-
ments of the reporter or editor (or to the arguments of counsel) as the source of the comment
or query set forth. Item 650, Perkins v. Micklethwaite, 1 P.W. 85 (1714); item 705, Short v.
Wood, 1 P.W. 470 (1718); item 1012, Piddock v. Brown, 3 P.W. 288, 294 (1734); item 1027,
Knight v. Knight, 3 P.W. 331, 333 (1734); item 1178, Frank v. Frank, 1 Ca. Ch. 84 (1667);
item 1179, Smith v. Smoult, I Ca. Ch. 88 (1668); item 1184, Gore v. Blake, I Ca. Ch. 98
(1668); item 1199, Nelthrop v. Hill et al., 1 Ca. Ch. 135 (1669); item 1216, Bovey v. Skipwith,
I Ca. Ch. 201 (1671); item 1217, Rich v. Sydenham, 1 Ca. Ch.202 (1671); items 1325 and
1326, Hele v. Hele, 2 Ca. Ch. 28, 29, 87 (1682); item 1559, Penhay v. Hurrell, Freeman 231,
235, 258 (1698), 2 Vern. 370 (1699). In item 1348, Davies v. Moreton, 2 Ca. Ch. 127 (1682),
the parenthetical comment calls attention to a circumstance appearing in the facts as stated
by the reporter. The bracketed material in item 1199, Nelthrop v. Hill et al., 1 Ca. Ch. 135,
137 (1669), is of similar character, and a query by the reporter is ignored by Jefferson.
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letter, service on the attorney without such an order would have been good
service, or perhaps also that under such a letter the attorney was authorized
to answer under his own oath. 60
Bracketed passages in the lengthy extracts from Lord Kames appear to
be Jefferson's notations of the English or Virginia equivalents of Scotch
practice described by Lord Kames. 61 Queries also appear in the text.62 Some
of these probably are indicative of Jefferson's own doubts. "Qu. would
not one, who pas money to an ex[ecuto]r before probat[e], be obliged to
pay it a second time, if the will is proved to be forged?"; 6 "Qu. if it is
not the S.C. carried by appeal from the M.R. to the L.K.?"; 64 "qu. if
decree is not somewhat different?"; 6 "but qu. if the words 'of his body'
are not omitted by mistake?";"6 "the M.R. declared the rule in these cases
60. Item 716, [Anon.], 1 P.W. 523 (1718). See also item 1402 (Jefferson's comment "as
I take it; for the report is almost unintelligible"). In that case, plaintiff was executrix of
defendant's employer. Defendant married the daughter of one Harrison and contended that
his employer promised to contribute to her portion as much as her father did. Plaintiff's bill
was to discover how much the father had, given. Defendant got a special verdict at law finding
that Harrison gave £2000. Plaintiff's amended bill alleged that a smaller sum had been given.
Defendant pleaded the verdict and on a demurrer the plea was held good. Notwithstanding
that ruling, plaintiff examined with respect to the value of Harrison's contribution and
defendant pleaded surprise. The Lord Chancellor said "Where there is right and equity, forms
of the Court and orders shall not hinder me to examine it; and it was so ordered." Shuter v.
Gilliard, 2 Ca. Ch. 250, 251 (1677). The report is indeed obscure but it would seem that
Jefferson misinterprets the court's language when he says "The def. coming into chancery
would have examined the grounds of the verdict but [the court] refused." In item 1740, Brond
v. Gipps, 2 Ch. Rep. 98 (1674), Jefferson says: "it does not appear from the book that the
lands were charged by the will, but we must suppose they were." In item 1968, Coleman v.
Wince, Pr. Ch. 511 (1718), he says: "qu. whether if the purchaser had had notice of the bond
debt, it might have altered the case? I beleive [sic] not."
61. See items 1122 and 1128.
62. See item 539 ("sed Q."), Bretton v. Lethurier, 2 Vern. 653 (1710); item 1160 ("but
Qu."), Rennessey v. Parrot, I Ca. Ch. 60 (1665). No query appears in the report of those
cases. But in item 579 ("Qu. tamen"), the query is in the report, and thus did not originate
with Jefferson. Basse v. Grey, 2 Vern. 692, 694 (1715).
63. Item 1173, Smallpiece v. Anguish, 1 Ca. Ch. 75 (1666). The court enjoined debtors
of the estate from making payments to an insolvent personal representative trying to collect
debts before determination of whether the will, alleged to be forged, was valid.
64. Item 1563, Jefferson's query, after citing Kingslader v. Courtney, Freeman 228 (Case
309, Trinity term 1700), and for the same principle Kimpland v. Courtney, Freeman 250 (case
318, Hilary term 1700), is supported by a marginal note in the latter case "Upon an Appeal.
Ante Case 309." In item 1012, referring to a case mentioned in the marginal note to Piddock
v. Brown, 3 P.W. 288, 294 (1734), Jefferson (in one of the rare instances where he cites P.W.
by page number; see also item 1027) asks: "Qu. if not S.C. as Pr. Ch. 266 (1708)." It is
possible that the case reported there as Woodman v. Skute, Pr. Ch. 266 (1708), is the same
case as Piddock v. Brown.
65. Item 443, Baskervile v. Baskervile, 2 Vern. 448 (1703); Baskerville v. Gore, Pr. Ch.
186 (1701).
66. Item 1686, Shelley v. Earsfield, 1 Ch. Rep. 206, 213-14 (1661). See also supra note
43. Likewise, a remainder in a marriage settlement to the children of the wife's body was held
to be a provision for children of that marriage only, and not to include a son by a second
marriage. Item 386, Dafforne v. Goodman and Bolt et ux., 2 Vern. 364 (1699); Dafforne v.
Bolt and Goodman, Freeman 288 (1698); Daffern v. Bolt, Pr. Ch. 96 (1699).
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was to be taken from the civil law, and not from the common law (qu.
canon law?)"; 67 and "a bill to be relieved against a verdict for excessive
damages was dismissed but Q. whether the Ld. K. did not argue as if he
would have done it in some cases." 6s
III. PEcuLIAR FEATURES OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
Lastly, it will be of interest to note some striking features of the
equitable relief afforded by English judges. An outstanding illustration of
the infusion of natural justice and moral principles is the equitable rather
than literal interpretation of documents, so as to give effect to the real
intent and purpose of the parties.
Thus a bequest to testator's "younger children" was interpreted as
meant for the benefit of daughters, and as excluding a younger son,. who
was testator's heir at law. Said the Lord Chancellor: "He is no younger
child within the devise, and shall not take as such." 69 Similarly, a bequest
to the testator's "post-humous daughter" was construed by Lord Chancellor
Somers to include a daughter born during the testator's lifetime, it appearing
that the will was written when the testator was ill and his wife pregnant,
and never was altered before his death.7 0 In another case a devise in trust,
to be conveyed to such of the testator's relatives as the trustee should think
best and most reputable for the testator's family, was awarded to the heir
at law, even though it was proved that the testator did not intend that his
heir should have it.7' Likewise, when property was left to the testator's
brothers' and sisters' children "at the discretion of his ex[ecuto]rs," the
Lord Chancellor decreed that "they should take equal shares." 7 2 And
legacies to the testator's "poor kindred" were treated as extending to
67. Item 1998, Mentney v. Petty, Pr. Ch. 593 (1722).
68. Item 144, Barker v. Holder, 1 Vern. 316 (1685).
69. Item 1522, Bretton v. Bretton, Freeman 158 (1659). However, in a devise to "poor
relations" the Countess of Winchelsea, who was as close a relation as any, claimed a share
and it was decreed, she was intitled thereto, in regard the Word [poor] was frequently
used as a Term of Indearment and Compassion, rather than to signify an indigent
Person; as one speaking of one's Father, often says my Poor Father, or of one's
Child, my poor Child. But this seems to have been a strained interpretation, in
Favour of the Earl and Countess of Winchelsea, who had not an Estate any Ways
proportionable to their Quality.
[Anon.], I P.W. 327 (1716). See infra note 73.
70. Item 1873, Jaggard v. Jaggard, Pr. Ch. 175, 176-77 (1701).
71. Item 1537, Clarke v. Freeman, Freeman 198 (1694). 'This court will judge it most
reputable for the family that the heir at law shall have it." Id.
72. Item 1477, Griffith v. Jones, Freeman 96 (1686). Jefferson adds that according to
another report of the case (2 Ch. Rep. 394) "it shall be distributed by the ex[ecuto]rs according
to their discretion." In another case a wife having under her husband's will a power "to
devise her estate among his three dau[ghte]rs in such prop[ortio]ns as she sh[oul]d think fit"
must divide it equally "unless a good reason be given for doing otherwise." Item 1901, Astry
v. Astry, Pr. Ch. 256 (1706).
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relatives "one degree further than he had expressed, and no further, and
all shall have equal shares."
7
In another case, however, the Lord Chancellor testily rejected a claim
by children for equal distribution. The will in question gave the residuary
estate to A in trust to give to his children and grandchildren "according to
their demerits." A gave it all to one. The others brought suit seeking a
share. The Lord Chancellor exclaimed "I sit not here to make wills for
men nor can interpret them farther than they go." He explained that
every demand must be certain before it can be decreed, but here is
incertainty in the persons who may demand, and in the time and
size of their demands.... The children here are not to come in by
the will immediately, but by the act of the devisee, who is appointed
to judge and distribute according to their merits. 74
Equity relieved against a gaming debt, where fraud was shown, even in
the absence of statute.75 In another case where morality affected the decision,
"the testator had one child, but was connected with a lewd woman. He
bequeathed his estate to his ex[ecuto]rs: two of whom swore he did it in
trust for the woman, the third swore he understood it was for his child."
The court declared that "as it was not proved strictly to be for the former,
and she being a lewd woman and having abused the test[ato]r, the child
should not be deprived of it.
' '76
Little extension of the ordinary meaning of the words used was required
in holding that when a son was en ventre sa mere at the obligor's death,
his daughter could not collect on a bond to pay her £900 "if he should
have no son living at his death." 77 Similarly, "an infant en ventre sa mere
73. Item 1477, Griffith v. Jones, Freeman 96 (1686). But here again Jefferson notes that
according to another report of the case, "it was deemed to extend only as far as stat. distribn
[the statute of distributions] and that their shares shall be at the ex[ecuto]rs discretion." See
also [Anon.], 1 P.W. 327 (1716).
74. Item 1284, Civil v. Rich, 1 Ca. Ch. 309 (1679). Similarly, the Lord Keeper exclaimed,
when refusing to enjoin vexatious litigation, that "it belongs to the parliam[en]t, not to me
to reform the law." Item 1902, Lord Bath v. Sherwin, Pr. Ch. 261, 262 (1706).
75. Item 1553, Humfryes v. Rigby, Freeman 223 (1688). The Lord Chancellor applied
the rule "once a fraud, always a fraud" in a case where a woman borrowed £160 from her
brother to make her marriage portion sufficient to satisfy her husband, and gave a bond for
the amount. Both spouses died without issue, and the brother also. The brother's executor
sued the wife's executor, who sought equitable relief, contending that there would have been
fraud only against the husband or his issue, and that the bond was good against the wife.
The Lord Chancellor decreed that "the husband and his wife might have been relieved on
their bill, ag[ains]t the fraud, and that which was once a fraud will alwais [sic] be so. Deliver
up the bond." Item 1977, Gale v. Lindo, I Vern. 475 (1687). For another application of the
same rule, see item 1482, Gay v. Wendow, Freeman 101 (1687).
76. Item 1629, Aynsworth v. Pollard, 1 Ch. Rep. 181 (1625).
77. Item 1554, Gibson v. Gibson, Freeman 223 (1698). Nor did the court hesitate to
rearrange the order in which remainders following a life estate to a father should stand, in
order that a remainder to trustees to support contingent remainders to the first and other sons
might have its effect, although in the will as written it came after, instead of before, the
devise to the sons. See item 1761, Green v. Rooke, 2 Ch. Rep. 169 (1679).
1272
EQUITY COMMONPLACE BOOK
(in its mother's womb) at the death of the father shall come in on
distrib[utio]n, for he is a child in the eye of the law, and ought to be
provided for as well as the rest.
' 78
Equitable considerations came emphatically to the fore when the Lord
Chancellor discharged a Quaker who had been committed for not answering
because his conscience was "too tender" to swear or affirm. The Lord
Chancellor declared that "it was a perversion of justice to make it's process
a means of oppression. Take his answer without oath or affirmation.
' 79
Another procedural ruling based on substantive justice was formulated as
follows: "Tho['] a purchase pendente lite [during the pendency of litigation],
for a valuable consid[eratio]n without notice, shall be set aside, yet as it is
a hard case, if there be any flaw at hearing on the pl's side, he shall not
amend, or make any new proof after publication. "80
Technicality in pleading received short shrift when, after a demurrer to
the bill had been filed because no administrator was party, the plaintiff
took out administration and filed an amendment to the bill. To the objection
that "this should have been done by a supplemental, not an amended bill,
because the latter is annexed to and becomes a part of the original bill;
and then it will be a bill by an adm[inistrato]r when there was none," the
Lord Chancellor decreed that "the letters of adm[inistratio]n pl. has taken
out refer [i.e., relate back] to the death of the intestate, like the case where
an ex[ecuto]r brings a bill, before probat[e] a subsequent probat[e] makes
the bill good, and in the present case, either a supplemental, or amended
bill was proper." 8' But in another case a bill of review was ruled to be the
78. Item 1558, Ball v. Smith, Freeman 230 (1698).
79. Item 770, Wood v. Story and Bell, 1 P.W. 781 (1721). A Jew was permitted to
swear on the Pentateuch. See item 126, [Anon.], 1 Vern. 263 (1684). When sending a
commission to the East Indies to take the answer of a person "of the Gentou religion" the
Chancellor declined to "appoint a solemn form of oath lest it should be contrary to their
notions of religion," but he ruled that the "commlissio]n[e]rs should administer such solemn
oath as in their discretions should seem meet, and that if it were any other than the Christian
oath they should certify it to the court at large." Item 2009, Ramkissenseat v. Barker, 1 Atk.
19, 20-21 (1739). See also item 2011, Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 40 (1744).
80. Item 894, Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 P.W. 482 (1728).
81. Item 1035, Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P.W. 349, 350-52 (1734). The report shows
that "his Lordship resented this plea as an affected Delay." Id. at 351. In another case
a deed was referred to by a depo[sitio]n, and it being said that it was now become
a part thereof, the M.R. had ordered leave to inspect it; but discharged by L.C. for
that the def. before hearing is not to see strength of p1's cause, or any deed to pick
holes in it.
Item 875, Davers v. Davers, 2 P.W. 410 (1727). To the same effect see item 951, Hodson v.
Earl of Warrington, 3 P.W. 5 (1729). However, in a later case the Lord Chancellor held that
"the def[endant]s by referring in their answers to deeds which were in their own poss[essio]n
had made them a part of their answer, and that, tho' they were the heir, they should produce
them." Item 1040, Bettison v. Farringdon, 3 P.W. 363 (1735). One gathers the impression
that the chancelior felt that the case would be terminated promptly upon production of the
deeds, for
as at the Hearing you admit the Court would do what has been desired; so it is for
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only means of attacking a decree which has become final. If relief could
be had by bringing an original bill,
the decisions of this court would be contradictory and breed great
confusion. The only remedy in such case is by bill of review, which
must be either for error appearing on the face of the decree, or on
some new matter as a release, receipt &c proved to have been
discovered since. For unless this relief were confined to such new
matter, it might be used to vex and oppress the other side, and
prevent the cause from being ever at rest.a
2
On the other hand, where a defendant pleaded a parol agreement in
bar to a suit to enforce a prior decree, the Lord Chancellor held that an
original bill must be brought in order to take advantage of such a defense.
For otherwise, by waiting to be sued and pleading in defense, "he makes
one witness to the argument serve; but if he brings an original bill and the
then def. denies the agreement two witnesses are necessary. So that by the
present method the now pl. loses the benefit of answering which he would
then have.""3
An unfair result, at least in the view of modern critics, was sanctioned
when it was decreed that an agreement, made by deed in writing between
a prospective husband and a widow with a jointure, that she should "dispose
of her jointure as she pleased," was immediately extinguished by the
marriage when it took place. 4 Another widow lost her claim to diamonds
and jewels worth £200 "which she pretended (but did not prove) to have
bo[ugh]t with money allowed by an agreement previous to the marriage as
a separate maintenance." The husband's creditor succeeded in subjecting
them to his debt. The Lord Chancellor said that
had the widow proved the agreement for separate maint[enan]ce
and that these things were purchased with that money, they w[oul]d
not be liable to the husb[an]d's debts: but they are now to be
consid[ere]d as paraphernalia, which being only superfluities and
ornaments to the wife, the law has subjected them to the husband's
debts rather than his creditors should starve."5
the Benefit of all Parties that it should be done before the Hearing; for if the Deed
be a proper one ... the plaintiff will go no further, which will put an End to the
Suit.
Id. at 364.
82. Item 1046, Taylor v. Sharp, 3 P.W. 371 (1735). When a bill of review to reverse a
decree was grounded on the fact that the plaintiff, a woman, had married before the decree,
and so the suit abated, it was decided "that a decree made in point of right ought not to be
reviewed on the point of a dilatory plea, which might have been pleaded in abatement." Item
1524, Cranborne v. Delahay, Freeman 169, 170 (1662).
83. Item 1292, Wakelin v. Waltha, 2 Ca. Ch. 8 (1679).
84. Item 1134, Darcy v. Chute, 1 Ca. Ch. 21 (1663). Cf. item 821, Cannel v. Buckle, 2
P.W. 243 (1724).
85. Item 1912, Willson v. Pack, Pr. Ch. 295 (1710). The Chancellor ordered the jewels
"to be sold to satisfy the plaintiff, unless the lady, whom he believed would be unwilling to
part with them, should pay the plaintiff his debt, and the costs of this suit." Id. at 298.
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Reasons of public policy dictated denial of a request that defendant
disclose the names of witnesses to a deed under which he claimed, the -
plaintiff contending that the deed was antedated. The Lord Chancellor
denied it "because it might tend to tamper[ing] with witnesses; but it might
be [granted] if there were apparent suspicion. 86 Similarly, in another case
plaintiff's father was committed for "advertising a reward to any person
who would prove a particular point in a suit depending here, because it
tended to subornation [of perjury]."87 Another practice frowned upon by
the court and regarded as "dangerous" for public policy reasons was that
of matchmaking by busybodies with a financial axe to grind. "A bond
given to the def. to procure a match between the pl. and his present wife
was set aside as a dangerous precedent.""8
Public policy and ethical principle likewise dictated the decision that a
bond was void which had been given by an appointee as supervisor of
excise to pay to the person procuring his appointment £10 per year as long
as he should continue in office. Said the Lord Chancellor: "Merit, industry,
and fidelity should recommend to these places: the taking from the office
part of the reasonable reward of his trouble will induce him to make it up
by unlawful means." 89
Discovery was granted with respect to goods purchased from a bankrupt
after bankruptcy. The defendant pleaded purchase for value and without
notice. Lord Keeper North said: "If the sale were at extreme undervalue,
the plea shall not stand; therefore, either set forth the goods or what you
paid for them." The defendant urged that upon discovery the bankruptcy
commissioners will assign the goods or the money "and so this court shall
wound a bona fide purchaser." The Lord Keeper said "Set forth the goods
and what you paid, on cond[itio]n the pl. consents to take no advantage
of the discovery but in this court, and not at law." The plaintiff accepted
these terms and subscribed his consent with the register.9°
Discovery of lands was denied when sought by the holder of a judgment
against property sold to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the
judgment. The Lord Chancellor "would not force a purchaser for valuable
consid[eratio]n without notice to discover any thing which might affect his
title." 91 Similarly, a demurrer was sustained on behalf of a woman to a bill
to discover whether she was married, for "if she was married it would
forfeit an estate devised to her by her late husband during widowhood." 92
86. Item 1324, [Anon.], 2 Ca. Ch. 84 (1681).
87. Item 748, Pool v. Sacheverel, I P.W. 675, 677 (1710).
88. Item 1622, Arrundel v. Trevillian, I Ch. Rep. 87 (1634).
89. Item 1055, Law v. Law, 3 P.W. 391 (1735). Plaintiff was the official's widow, suing
to be relieved from the bond. Defendant was his brother, who had sued on the bond at law,
where the widow made a sham plea of payment, and sought relief in equity.
90. Item 1361, Wagstaff v. Read, 2 Ca. Ch. 156 (1683).
91. Item 1314, Snelling v. Squib, 2 Ca. Ch. 47 (1680). See also item 1288, [Anon.], 2
Ca. Ch. 4 (1679); supra note 81.
92. Item 1730, Monnins v. Mormins, 2 Ch. Rep. 69 (1672). For other cases on discovery,
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Courts of equity were touchy regarding any affront to their authority.
Thus when an executor pleaded plene administravit (fully administered) at
law and then confessed judgment in favor of another person while a bill in
equity brought by a creditor for discovery of assets was pending, the
Chancellor "decreed him to pay the complainant's whole debt; for he shall
not be defrauded while he is proceeding in this court." 93 And when parties
signed, in the presence of the court, an order to submit to an award
intended to be a final disposition of the controversy, but afterwards one of
them revoked the agreement, the court declared that while "nothing less
than a legislative power can make irrevocable a submission which in it's
nature is revocable" that sort of behavior "is such an abuse of the court
as that we may justly lay the party by the heels."' '
Propriety was required in court proceedings. Where "an answer, and
also exceptions to the master's report were very scandalous, the def. was
therefore ordered to pay the pl. 100 lib. for his reparation and costs, and
the solicitor to pay 20. lib. and be committed till he pay." 9 But "if a
witness on an interrogatory deposes scandal, he shall not pay costs, for it
was the fault of the commrs. to take it down."
96
Obstructing the course of justice by interfering with participants in
court proceedings was a particularly serious transgression. "A party attend-
ing his suit here was arrested in an action. The court committed the bailiff
who arrested him." ' 97 After the prisoner had been released by order of
court, "an action of escape was brought ag[ains]t the sheriff. The court
ordered the action to be discharged." 98 Other bailiffs offended by serving
an execution "in breach of an injunction of this court." They "find money
hid in the house and carry it away." The court's reaction was peremptory:
"Let the party at whose suit the ex[ecutio]n was taken out make good this
money, and all the damage which the pl. shall swear he hath sustained."99
Service of a subpoena on a party, provided a bill be later actually filed,
creates a fis pendens, for otherwise a man on the service of a subpoena
see item 227; Hungerford v. Goreing, 2 Vern. 38 (1687); item 951, Hodson v. Earl of
Warrington, 3 P.W. 35 (1729); item 1167, Angell v. Draper, 1 Vern. 399 (1686); item 1288,
[Anon.], 2 Ca. Ch. 4 (1679); item 1645, Bishop v. Bishop, I Ch. Rep. 142, 144 (1639); item
1718, Shalmer v. Evesham, 2 Ch. Rep. 29 (1689); item 1762, Trethervy v. Hoblin, 2 Ch. Rep.
172 (1764); item 2014, Duncalf v. Blake, 1 Atk. 52 (1737).
93. Item 1476, [Anon.], Freeman 93 (1685).
94. Item 1210 (see supra note 23), Hide v. Petit, I Ca. Ch. 187 (1670), Freeman 133.
95. Item 1776, Whitlock v. Marriot, 2 Ch. Rep. 386 (1685).
96. Item 872, [Anon.], 2 P.W. 406 (1726).
97. Item 1688, Meynel v. Cooper, 1 Ch. Rep. 217 (1661). See also item 2016, Ex parte
Kerney, I Atk. 54 (1744).
98. Item 1689, Meynel v. Cooper, I Ch. Rep. 217 (1661).
99. Item 101, Childrens v. Saxby, 1 Vern. 207 (1683). The Lord Keeper
thought it an idle practice in the Court to put a thief to his oath to accuse himself;
for he that has stolen will not stick to forswear it; ... therefore in odium spoliatoris
[to the disadvantage of the wrongdoer] the oath of the party injured should be a
good charge upon him that has done the wrong.
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might alien his land "and prevent the justice of the court."'0 The court
stoutly declared that a judgment creditor "is not to be Chancellor" and
affect the rights of other creditors.' 0 '
The Lord Chancellor vigorously made clear that he "much disliked
these doings" when a mountebank sought to gain from exhibition as a
curiosity of a monstrous birth (having two heads, four arms, and four legs)
both before and after the death of the creature. Plaintiff, its mother, was
to receive during its life one-eighth of the profits from showing it. It lived
but a month, and the defendant embalmed the body and kept it. Plaintiff
sued to be relieved of her agreement and an accounting of the profits from
exhibition. The Lord Chancellor, after expressing his distaste, "decreed the
prayer of the bill and full costs, and that the def. should bury the body
within a week."'l12
With equal disgust the Lord Chancellor rejected the complaint of a
man who had deserted a woman by whom he had had a child. He had
given her a bond for £500 to pay her £50 and maintain the child. He
offered to pay the £50 and sought to enjoin the bond "alleging, as the
truth was, that the lady had been taken in bed with another man before.
L.C. refused the inj[unctio]n, saying this should not be a court to examine
such matters. 'Iniquity, sais the editor, takes away equity.' "103 The Lord
Chancellor was equally outspoken in another case where the plaintiff had
seduced his wife's sister and had several children by her. He gave her some
bonds as a provision for her and the children, and afterwards gave her a
weekly allowance. When she brought suit on one of the bonds, he sought
relief in equity, alleging that the bonds were void for lack of consideration
100. Item 146, [Anon.], 1 Vern. 318 (1685). A writ of ne exeat regno (let him not leave
the kingdom) prohibiting a party from leaving the country "may be granted even in a case of
private concernment, if there is danger of subterfuge from the justice of the nation." Item
1399, Sir Robert Henly v. -, 2 Ca. Ch. 245 (1678). For other cases on ne exeat, see item
1021, Ex parte Brunker, 3 P.W. 312 (1734); item 1189, Read v. Read, 1 Ca. Ch. 115 (1668);
item 1895, Le Clea v. Trot, Pr. Ch. 230 (1704).
101. A creditor by judgm[en]t was paid by the ex[ecuto]r out of the personal estate,
whereby there is failure of assets for other creditors. L.C. They shall have the benefit
of his judgm[en]t ag[ains]t the land, for tho' the judgment creditor may proceed at
law ag[ains]t either real or personal estate; yet he is not to be Chancellor to prevent
paim[en]t of the debts, when he is not prejudiced by it.
Item 1490, Goree v. Marsh, Freeman 113 (1690). The same thought occurs in a fourteenth
century record. A thief who had stolen a cow escaped while being taken to jail and was
decapitated when he resisted and could not otherwise be recaptured. The court ordered "that
the man who had decapitated the prisoner should be arrested. He would be arraigned for the
killing because he had made himself judge (pur ceo qil se fist mesme iuge). But if the facts
were found to be as described above, he would be acquitted." THE EYRE oF NORTHAmpToNsHMI,
3-4 EDWARD III, A.D. 1329-1330, VoLumE I, 97 Tan PuBucAloNs OF THE SEMDEN SocIETY
199, 207, 213 (D. Sutherland ed. 1983).
102. Item 1335, Herring v. Walround, 2 Ca. Ch. 110 (1682).
103. Item 1296, Bodly v. -, 2 Ca. Ch. 15 (1679). Relief was likewise denied against a
bond to pay £400 to a "kept woman," but the decision would have been otherwise had it
been proved "that the def. was a common strumpet, and used to draw in young gentlemen."
Item 207, Whaley v. Norton, 1 Vern. 483 (1687). See also supra note 45.
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or were satisfied by the weekly allowance. The Lord Chancellor said: "I
can do no more ag[ains]t the bail than decree principal, interest, and good
costs; let these therefore to be paid, or the bill to be dism[isse]d and it is
pity I can do no more."' 4
In a case where A, B, C, and D were trustees, A brought a bill to
remove D as trustee. B and C answer that they are not willing to serve
with D, but he insists on continuing. The Lord Chancellor emphatically
declared: "I like not that a man should be ambitious of a trust, when he
can get nothing but trouble for it." The Lord Chancellor then discharged
D. 10 5 Another rule derived from ethical principle is attributed to a famous
Lord Chancellor:
Before L[or]d Nottingham's time it was held that where lands were
devised to be sold for the paiment of debts and legacies, they should
be paid pan passu: but he held the debts should be preferred, for
he said he would not make a man sin in his grave, and such has
been the course since.106
Justice, rather than technical legality, is always uppermost in governing
the action of a court of equity. 1°7 Equitable relief is inherently discretion-
ary.1°s If the equities are not strongly in favor of a party invoking equitable
relief, the court of equity may decline to intervene, and decide to leave the
party to the party's remedy at law. This doctrine is expressed in the familiar
maxims "he who seeks equity must do equity" and that a litigant must
come into a court of equity "with clean hands." A certain degree of
arbitrariness and imprecision is inevitable, as the outcome of each case
depends upon the impact which the circumstances of the case make upon
the conscience of the chancellor. 1°9
104. Item 1850, Spicer v. Hayward, Pr. Ch. 114 (1700).
105. Item 1350, Uvedale v. Ettrick, 2 Ca. Ch. 130, 131 (1682). Jefferson adds the
reporter's note that "a trust being a creature of equity, equity will not only modify and
regulate the execution of trusts, but also direct, limit and controul [sic], the actions of the
trustees." Id.
106. Item 1975, Brunsden v. Stratton, Pr. Ch. 575 (1721). Regarding the importance of
Lord Nottingham as "Father of Modem Equity," see 6 W. HOLDSWORrH, supra note 31, at
541-48.
107. Technicalities often were disregarded in equity. Thus when a warrant had been issued
by the Chancellor directing that a person who had failed to pay money as ordered by the
Court "stand committed for his contempt" the delinquent debtor surrendered on a Sunday to
the Warden of the Fleet, and then contended that he should be discharged on the ground that
his arrest on Sunday was void. The Lord Chancellor rejected this argument, citing a comment
by Chief Justice Holt that the Lord's day "should not'be a sanctuary for malefactors." Item
2017, Ex parte Whitchurch, 1 Atk. 55 (1749).
108. For a discussion of equitable discretion, see item 945, Cowper v. Cowper, 2 P.W.
720, 753 (1734).
109. See supra notes 7-9. On one occasion the Lord Chancellor explicitly emphasized that
"I know not on what reasons [a case cited by counsel] was decreed, but I am to decree
according to my own conscience, and every case stands on it's own bottom." Item 243, Earl
of Rivers v. Earl of Danby, 2 Vern. 72 (1688). A plaintiff, seeking favor from the court, may
be subjected to conditions which cannot be imposed on a defendant. Item 39, Micoe v. Powell,
1 Vern. 37 (1682); item 157, Hale v. Thomas, I Vern. 345 (1685).
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These characteristic peculiarities of equity are illustrated in cases from
the Equity Commonplace Book. Thus Jefferson records that "chancery will
not execute it's own decrees by bill, without examining the justice thereof,
much less those of another court.""' 0 The rule is elaborated in another case
in these terms:
When a decree is capable of being executed by the ordinary process
of the court, process shall go without attending to the inequity of
the decree, because it is not the act of the present judge, and so
his conscience is not concerned. But where the ordinary process
cannot execute the decree, but it is become necessary to bring an
original bill, and to obtain a second decree, the judge must make
it his own act, and therefore will enter on the merits.'
Equity seeks to do complete justice.
It is not always true that where a man has a title at law he shall
pursue his legal remedy and not have a decree in chancery. For
where there is just occasion to come into this court, and-the court
is by that means possessed of the cause and the right fully examined
here, it will not after that send the pl. to law. This court never
decreed a suit where it might decree a remedy."
2
Hence, "where a matter remediable at law is complicated with other matters
proper in equity, this court will determine the whole matter.""' 3
On the other hand, parties were often left to pursue whatever remedies
were available to them at law. In one such case, a lessee for years, with
covenants to repair, assigned the lease by way of mortgage for money
borrowed. The tenements being out of repair, the lessor brought a bill
against the mortgagee to discover whether the lease had not been assigned
to him so as to compel him to repair. The court concluded, although "it
was the m[ortga]gee's folly to take the whole lease and thereby subject
himself to pay the rent and repair tho' he could not have possession," that
"as he is only a m[ortga]gee and has not had possession we will not help
the pl. to a discovery, but let him recover at law as well as he can."
'" 4
Similarly, if dealings between merchants have ceased for a long time "and
there has been a seeming acquiescence" with respect to the state of their
mutual accounts, "we will leave them to the law.""
5
Another striking illustration of relegating a party to his legal remedies
is denial of specific performance in case of inequitable contracts, where
110. Item 317, Baker v. Childs, 2 Vern. 226 (1691).
111. Item 1752, Lawrence v. Berney, 2 Ch. Rep. 127 (1677).
112. Item 180, Earl of Kildare v. Sir Mortice Eustace, 1 Vern. 428, 437, 438 (1686).
Similarly, after completion of discovery proceedings in equity, "we will not send them to
law." Item 354, Christ-College in Cambridge v. Widrington, 2 Vern. 282 (1692). See also item
1056, Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P.W. 395, 397 (1735).
113. Item 1458, Graves v. White, Freeman 57, 64 (1680).
114. Item 347, Pilkington v. Shaller, 2 Vern. 374 (1700).
115. Item 348, Sherman v. Sherman, 2 Vern. 276 (1692).
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that remedy would otherwise have been available. Thus on a bill for specific
performance of articles to purchase,"16 the Lord Chancellor
declared he was not bound to assist contracts which were harsh and
unequitable, or are attended with such circumstances as would be
a hardship on the def. That this case was proper for a jury who
might mitigate or moderate damages according to circumstances;
whereas this court could take no advantage of such circumstances,
but must decree exec[utio]n, or dismiss the bill. And therefore the
bill was dismissed, tho' without costs.1
7
Where a party claiming title to land or a sole right to a fishery is out
of possession, and thus able to vindicate his right at law, the equitable
remedy of perpetuating testimony of witnesses in support of his claim will
be denied, and the claimant relegated to his action at law. The reasons for
this rule were explained in a case where the claimant to a sole right of
fishery was in possession and the bill to perpetuate testimony was upheld.
For "if a man is in possession and is only threatened with disturbances, he
can bring no action at law, and has no remedy but by bill to perpetuate
his testimony." Where an action at law is available it is preferable, since
the depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony are not made
public until after their death, and they are thus in a position to commit
"the gravest perjury and go unpunished; besides, the party having his
remedy at law, the other should not be deprived of an opportunity of
confronting & publicly examining the witnesses which has alwais been found
the most effectual method for discovering truth."
' 8
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing survey of certain aspects of Jefferson's Equity
Commonplace Book, it seems clear that in his own research he faithfully
practiced the method which he admonished law students to follow, of
seeking out "the pith of the case" and of "never using two words where
116. Specific performance ordinarily would be granted where the subject of the contract
of purchase was land or unique chattels.
117. Item 1993, Sir Harry Hick v. Phillips, Pr. Ch. 575 (1721). On the other hand,
"where an agreement is to save the honor and preserve the peace of a family and is a
reasonable agreement, a court of equity will be glad to lay hold of any just ground to carry
it into ex[ecutio]n." Item 2002, Stapilton v. Stapilton, I Atk. 2, 5, 11 (1739). The agreement
upheld in Stapilton was designed by Philip, the father of two sons Henry and Philip, to divide
his property between them, to avoid controversy regarding the legitimacy of Henry and to
provide for both sons equitably. Plaintiff was the son of Henry and at first claimed the whole
estate, but after Henry had been found illegitimate, claimed his share under the agreement.
Defendant was the younger son Philip.
118. Item 1981, Duke of Dorset v. Girdler, Pr. Ch. 532 (1720). For further discussion of
rules regarding bills to perpetuate testimony, based upon the same case, see items 1982 and
1983. Blackstone similarly praised the common law system of public examination of witnesses




one will do." His treatment of every case was indeed "condensed into the
narrowest compass possible which will admit of presenting distinctly the
principles of the case."" 9 His notebook plainly manifests his powers of
acute legal analysis. Careful comparison of different reports of the same
case (and different cases relating to the same subject matter) is evidenced
by his supplemental annotations and queries exhibiting his own reflections
on the topic under consideration.
How effectively Jefferson concentrated upon the controlling issues of.
the cases which he analyzed, and condensed his account of them "into the
narrowest compass possible" by eliminating colorful but legally unimportant
details, can be interestingly demonstrated by reviewing some of the omitted
passages from judicial decisions which he summarized in the Equity Com-
monplace Book. In a case where relief was granted against a bond given
for money won at gaming, Jefferson tells us only that "the parties were
very poor, and [there was] some little suspicion that the def. had not played
fairly." Freeman's report informs us that the plaintiff was a distiller of
strong spirits and the defendant was a tapster; that the game they were
playing was known as "all-fours;" that the defendant was laying out the
cards, and the knave of clubs turned up several times together. In the
court's opinion it was "an unreasonable Sum for such Persons to [venture]
at play."' 20
The report in Atkyns of the decision to admit evidence not given under
the sanction of a Christian oath covers thirty pages of copious discussion,
almost resembling a Supreme Court opinion dealing with the First Amend-
ment. We learn also that the ceremony which generates for the Gentou
plaintiff the obligation to testify truthfully is to touch the foot or hand of
a Brahmin priest.' 2'
Jefferson's laconic account of Pool v. Sacheverel"' omits many colorful
details. The case involved the estate left by one Sacheverel, whose daughter
by his first wife was married to plaintiff Pool. The question before the
court was whether the defendant, who had been Sacheverel's maid servant,
was his wife. She had given birth to a bastard by him but claimed that
before the birth of a second child she had been married to Sacheverel at
the Fleet prison, the parties to the marriage having used the names Robert
Marshall and Ann How, spinster. Edward Pool, plaintiff's father, inserted
an advertisement in a newspaper reciting the entry in the Register of the
Fleet, and further stating: "Whoever shall discover and legally prove that
the said two Persons were then married, and before and at the time of the
Marriage were really called and known by those respective names, shall
have a Reward for such Discovery (on legal Proof of the same) of 100 1.
over and above all legal Charges, to be paid by Edward Pool."
119. See supra note 1.
120. See supra note 75. The report does not state the amount of the wager, except that
it was under £100.
121. 1 Atk. at 21; see supra note 79.
122. See supra note 87.
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A motion that Pool be committed was put over by the Master of the
Rolls for hearing before the Lord Chancellor "as being a Matter of great
Moment, concerning, on one Side, the Liberty of the Subject, and on the
other, the Preservation of Evidence from Subordination and Corruption.'
1
2
After prolonged deliberation and with great solemnity, Lord Chancellor
Parker (who apparently was acquainted with Mr. Pool and acknowledged
the probity of his character, but nevertheless felt bound to commit him,
124
'pronounced judgment: "This tends to the Suborning of Witnesses, is very
dangerous, and not only greatly Criminal, but is a Contempt of the Court,
being a Means of preventing Justice in a Cause now depending ...; and
as the Court may so in Justice it ought, to punish this Proceeding.'
12
The chancellor pointed out that
This Advertisement will come to all Persons, to Rogues as well as
honest Men, and it is a strange Way of arguing to say, that offering
a Reward to one Witness is criminal, but that offering it to more




It is a Reproach to the Justice of the Nation, and an insufferable
Thing, to make a publick Offer in Print to procure Evidence, and
is tantamount to saying, that such Persons as will come in and
swear, or procure others to swear such a Thing, shall have 100 1.
Reward; and this in a Cause now depending here.
And though conceding Pool's honesty, the Lord Chancellor continued: "Yet
the Justice of the Court, nay the Justice of the Nation being concerned in
so publick a Case, I cannot dismiss the Party ... but in Justice, and for
Example's Sake, he must stand committed."' 27
In addition to displaying Jefferson's skill in penetrating to the heart of
a case, and stating its holding concisely and precisely, the Equity Common-
place Book demonstrates that the body of doctrine recorded by Jefferson
accurately mirrors the development of equity jurisprudence as expounded
by eminent legal historians and authoritative treatises. Jefferson was obvi-
ously a well qualified equity practitioner. Early in his legislative career he
drafted a bill establishing a separate court of equity in republican Virginia,'
28
123. 1 P.W. at 676. Echoes of this conflict are bandied about today under the rubric
"free speech versus fair trial."
124. Id. at 678.
125. Id. at 677.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 678.
128. Bill for Establishing a High Court of Chancery (Nov. 25, 1776), 1 THE PAPERS OF
THo MAS JEFFERSON 610-20 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
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and from his scholarly preceptor George Wythe,12 9 renowned for many years
of service as chancellor, 3° he could not fail to have absorbed a solid
understanding of equitable principles. Having, in the familiar preamble of
the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed America's allegiance to "the
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," he had no difficulty in compre-
hending and promoting the infusion of moral precepts and natural justice
which equity contributed to the Anglo-American legal system.
129. The first printed Virginia law report was Wythe's Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by
the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, reversing
some of those Decisions, published in 1795. A second edition, by B.B. Minor, appeared in
1852. See E. DumBAuLD, supra note 1, at 75 & n.3, 95 n.93, 120 n.261. Wythe was a diligent
classical scholar, and his "engaging pedantry" is displayed in his judicial opinions. "Greek
and Latin maxims, long dead names from old mythologies, allusions to figures of history and
literature, snatches of scientific truths, and algebraic equations, follow each other across the
pages of his decisions." 2 D. MAYs, EDMUND PENDLETON 292 (1952). It was said of him that
"he could hardly refrain from giving a line of Horace the force of an act of Assembly." Id.
Wythe held the first American law professorship and the second (after Blackstone) in any
English-speaking country. The post was established in 1779 during Jefferson's governorship.
C. WARmEN, A HISTORY oF THE AiimcAN BAR 343-45 (1913).
130. For a recent brief biography of Wythe, see A. Dmn, GEoRGE Wran, TincmR oF
LmERTY (1979). After an illustrious career at the bar and in public service (including his
signature on the Declaration of Independence at the head of the Virginia delegation and
election as speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates) Wythe became one of three judges of
the Court of Chancery in 1778. From 1789 he was sole chancellor of Virginia until in 1802
additional chancery courts were erected in Williamsburg and Staunton. Wythe remained as
chancellor of the Richmond court until his death on June 8, 1806. He died of arsenic poison
administered by his sister Anne's grandson, whom he had treated with great kindness and who
was then living with Wythe in the yellow wooden house at the southeast corner of Grace and
Fifth streets in Richmond. Wythe never directly accused George Sweeney of the crime, but
added a codicil to his will disinheriting the youth. Sweeney was acquitted of the murder largely
because under Virginia law at that time the testimony of a black woman servant was not
admissible against a white defendant. Id. at 79-82; see also J. BoYD, Tan MURDER OF GEORGE
WYTHm 22, 42-43, 45-46 (1949) (privately printed for the Philobiblon Club). Minor's edition
of Wythe's Decisions, (supra note 129), contains a Memoir of the Author (pp. xi-xl), including
his will and three codicils.
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